We describe a distril-uted model of information processing and memory and apply it to the representation of general and specific information. The model consists of a large number of simple processing elements which send excitatory and inhibitory signals to each other via modifiable connections. Information processing is thought of as the process whereby patterns of activation are formed over the units in the model through their excitatory and inhibitory interactions.
1983b; Whittlesea, 1983) , and pronunciation tasks (Glushko, 1979) all seem to be Quite sensitive to the congruity between particular training stimuli and particular test stimuli in ways which most abstraction models would not expect.
At the same time, a number of models have been proposed in which behavior which has often been characterized as rule-based concept-based is attributed to a process that makes use of stored traces of specific events or specific exemplars of the concepts or rules.
According to this class of models, the appar- 
Models of this class include the Medin and
Shaffer (1978) context model, Hintzman (1983) multiple trace model, and Whittlesea (1983) episode model. This trend is also exemplified by our interactive activation model of word perception , and an extension of the interactive activation model to generalization from exemplars (McClelland, 1981) .
One feature of some of these exempIarbased models troubles us. Many of them are internally inconsistent with respect to the issue of abstraction. Thus, though our word perception model assumes that linguistic rujes emerge from a conspiracy of partial actifations of detectors for particular words, thereb,y eliminating the need for abstraction of rules, the assumption that there is a single detector for each word implicitly assumes that there is an abstraction process that lumps each occurrence of the same word into the same single detector unit. Thus, the model has its abstraction and creates it too, though at slightly different levels.
One logically coherent response to this inconsistency is to simply say that each word or other representational object is itself conspiracy of the entire ensemble of memory traces of the different individual experiences we have had with that unit. We will call this view the enumeration of specific experiences view. It is exemplified most clearly by Jacoby (1983a, I983b) , Hintzman (1983) , and Whittlesea (1983) .
As the papers just mentioned demonstrate enumeration of specific experiences can work quite well as an account of quite a number of empirical findings. However, there still seems to be one drawback. Such models seem to require an unlimited amount of storage capacity, as well as mechanisms for searching an almost unlimited mass of data. This is especially true when we consider that the primitives out of which we normally assume one experience is built are themselves as tractions. For example , a word is a sequence of letters, or a sentence is a sequence of words. Are we to believe that all of these abstractions are mere notational conveniences for the theorist, and that every event is stored as an extremely rich (obviously structured) representation of the event, with no abstraction?
In this article, we consider an alternative conceptualization: a distributed, superpositional approach to memory. This view is similar to the separate enumeration of experiences view in some respects, but not in all.
On both views, memory consists of traces resulting from specific experiences; and on both views, generalizations emerge from the superposition of these specific memory traces. Our model differs, though , from the enumeration of specific experiences in assuming that the superposition of traces occurs at the time of storage. We do not keep each trace in a separate place, but rather we superimpose them so that what the memory contains is a composite.
Our theme will be to show that distributed models provide a way to resolve the abstraction-representation of specifies dilemma.
With a distributed model, the superposition of traces automatically results in abstraction though it can still preserve to some extent the idiosyncrasies of specific events and experiences, or of specific recurring subclasses of events and experiences.
We will begin by introducing a specific version of a distributed model of memory.
We will show how it works and describe some of its basic properties. We will show how our model can account for several recent findings (Salasoo, Shiffrin, & Feustel , 1985; Whittlesea, 1983) , on the effects of specific experiences on later performance, and the conditions . ---------.---...-.----. For example, even what we might consider to be a primitive feature of something, like having a particular color, might be a pattern of activation over a collection of units.
Modular structure.
We assume that the units are organized into modules. Each module receives inputs from other modules, the units within the module are richly interconnected with each other, and they send outputs to other modules. Figure the number of modules. We would imagine that there would be thousands to millions of units per module and many hundreds or perhaps many thousands of partially redundant modules in anything close to a complete memory system.
The state of each module represents a synthesis of the states of all of the modules it receives inputs from. Some of the inputs will be from relatively more sensory modules, closer to the sensory end-organs of one modality or another. Others will come from relatively more abstract modules, which themselves receive inputs from and send out- In a disltributed memory system, a mental state is a pattern of activation over the units in some subset of the modules. The patterns in the . different modules capture different aspects of Our model adheres to the following general the content of the mental states in a partially assumptions, some of which are shared with o. verlapping fashion. Alternative mental states several other distributed models of processing are simply alternative patterns of activation and memory. over the modules. Information processing under which functional equivalents of abstract representations such as prototypes or logogens emerge. The discussion considers generalizations of the approach to the semantic-episodic distinction and the acquisition of linguistic rule systems, and considers reasons for preferring a distributed-superpositional memory over other models.
Previous. related models.
Before we get down to work, some important credits are in order. Our distributed model draws heavily from the work of Anderson (e. g., 1977 Anderson (e. g., , 1983 Anderson, Silverstein, Ritz, & Jones, 1977;  Knapp & Anderson, 1984) and Hinton (1981a) . We have adopted and synthesized what we found to be the most useful aspects of their distinct but related models, preserving (we hope) the basic spirit of both. We view our model as an exemplar of a class of existing models whose exploration Hinton, Anderson, Kohonen (e.g., Kohonen, 1977; Kohonen, Oja, & Lehtio, 1981) , and others have pioneered. A useful review of prior work in this area can be obtained from Anderson and Hinton (1981) and other articles in the volume edited by Hinton and Anderson (1981) . Some points Mrnilar to some of these we will be making have recently been covered in the papers of Murdock (1982) and Eich (1982) , though the distributed representations we use are different in important ways from the representations used by these other authors.
Our distributed model is not a complete theory of human information processing and memory. It is a model of the internal structure of some components of information processing, in particular those concerned with the retrieval and use of prior experience. The model does not specify in and of itself how these acts of retrieval and use are planned, sequenced, and organized into coherent patterns of behavior.
A Distributed Model of Memory
General Properiies ---4 F;gun J. A simple information processing module, consisting of a small ensemble of eight processing units. (Each unit recmes inputs from other modules (indicated by the single input impinging 011 the input line of the node from the left; this can stand for a number of copveraing input siJlllls from snaaI nodes outside the module) and sends outputs to other modules (indicated by the output line proceeding to the right from each unit). Each unit also has a modifiable connection to all the other units in the same module, as indicated by the branches of the output lines that loop back onto the input lines leading into each unit. AU amnectioas, which may be positi\'e or nepti\'e, are represented by dots.
the process of evolution i. time of mental states.
Units play specific roles within patterns.
A pattern of activation only counts as the same as another if the same units are involved. module send inputs to some of the nodes in the olhL'f. The exact number and organization of modules is of course unknown; the ficure is simply intended to be suggestive.
The reason for this is that the knowledge built into the system for recreating the patterns is built into the set of interconnections among the units, as we will explain later. For a pattern to access the right knowledge it must arise on the appropriate units. In this sense, the units play specific roles in the patterns. Obviously, a system of this sort useless without sophisticated perceptual processing mechanisms at the interface between memory and the outside world, so that similar input patterns arising at different locations in the world can be mapped into the same set of units internally. Such mechanisms are outside the scope of this article (but see Hinton, 198Ib; McClelland, 1985) . This view of the nature of the memory trace clearly sets these kinds of models apart from traditional models of memory in which some copy of the "active" pattern is generally thought of as being stored directly. Instead ---. . .
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of this, what is actually stored in our model is changes in the connection strengths. These changes are derived from the presented pattern, and are arranged in . such a way that when a part of a known pattern is presented for processing, the interconnection strengths cause the rest of the pattern to be reinstated. Thus, although the memory trace is not a copy of the learned pattern, it is something from which a replica of that pattern can be recreated. . As we already said, each memory trace is distributed over many different connections, and each connection participates in many different memory traces. The traces of different mental states are therefore superimposed in the same set of weights. Surprisingly enough, as we will see in several examples, the connections between the units in a single module can store the information needed to complete many different familiar patterns.
Retrieval as reinstatement of prior pattern of activation.
Retrieval amounts to partial reinstatement of a mental state, using a cue which is a fragment of the original state. For any given module, we can see the cues as originating from outside of it. Some cues could arise ultimately from sensory input. Others would arise from the results of previous retrieval operations fed back to the memory system under the control of a search or retrieval plan. It would be pre~ture to speculate on how such schemes \tould be implemented in this kind of a mode1, but it is clear that they must exist.
Detailed AssumptionĨ n the rest of our presentation, we will be focusing on operations that take place within a single module. This obviously oversimplifies the behavior of a complete memory system because the modules are assumed to be in continuous interaction. The simplification is justified, however, in that it allows us to focus on some of the basic properties of distributed memory that are visible even without these interactions with other modules.
Let us look, therefore, at the internal structure of one very simple module, as shown in Figure I . Again, our image is that in a real system there would be much larger numbers of units. We have restricted our analysis to small numbers simply to illustrate basic principles as clearly as possible; this also helps to keep the running time of simulations in bounds.
Activation values.
The units take on activation values which range from -I to + I Z ero represents in this case a neutral resting value, toward which the activations of the units tend to decay. Given a fixed set of inputs to a particular unit, its activation level will be driven up or down in response until the activation reaches the point where the incremental effects of the input are balanced by the decay. In practice, of course, the situation is complicated by the fact that as each units' activation is changing it alters the input to the others. Thus, it is necessary to run the simulation to see how the system will behave for any given set of inputs and any given set of weights. In all the simulations reported here, the model is allowed to run for 50 cycles, which is considerably more than enough for it to achieve a stable pattern of activation over all the units.
Inputs
Memory traces.
The memory trace of a What the delta rule can and cannot do.
The delta rule is a continuous variant of the perceptron convergence procedure (Rosenblatt, 1962) , and has been independently invented many times (see Sutton & Barto, 1981 , for a discussion). Its popularity is based on the fact that it is an error-correcting rule, unlike the Hebb rule used until recently by Anderson (1977; Anderson et aI., 1977) . A number of interesting theorems have been proven about this rule (Kohonen, 1977; Storie, 1985) . Basically, the important result is that, for a set of patterns which we present repeatedly to a module, if there is a set of weights which will allow the system to reduce /1 to 0 for each unit in each pattern, this rule will find it through repeated exposure to all of t~e members of the set of patterns.
It is important to note that the existence of a set of weights that will allow /1 to be reduced to 0 is not guaranteed, but depends on the structure inherent in the set of patterns which the model is given to learn. To be perfectly learnable by our model , the patterns must conform to the following linear predictability constraint:
. Over the entire set of patterns, the external input to each unit must be predictable from a linear combination of the activations of every other unit. This is an important constraint, for there are many sets of patterns that violate it. However, it is necessary to distinguish between the patterns used inside the model, and the stimulus patterns to which human observers might be exposed in experiments, as described by psychologists. For our model to work, it is important for patterns to be assigned to stimuli in a way that will allow them to be learned.
A crucial issue, then, is the exact manner in which the stimulus patterns are encoded.
As a rule of thumb, an encoding which treats each dimension or aspect of a stimulus separately is unlikely to be sufficient; what is required is a context sensitive encoding, such that the representation of each aspect is colored by the other aspects. For a full discussion Rumelhart (in press).
Decay. in the incremellls to the weights.
We assume that each trace or increment undergoes a decay process though the rate decay of the increments is assumed to be much slower than the rate of decay of patterns of activation. Following a number of theorisls (e.g., Wickelgren, 1979) , we imagine that traces at first decay rapidly, but then the remaining portion becomes more and more resistant to further decay. Whether it ever reaches a point where it is no longer decaying at all we do not know. The basic effect of this assumption is that individual inputs exert large short-term effects on the weights , but after they decay the residual effect is considerably smaller. The fact that each increment has its own temporal history increases the complexity of computer simulations enormously. In all of the particular cases to be examined, we will therefore specify simplified assumptions to keep the simulations tractable.
Illustrative Examples
In this section, we describe a few illustrative examples to give the reader a feel for how we use the model, and to illustrate key aspects of its behavior. Before the first presentation of either pattern, we start out with all the weights set to O. The first pattern is given at the top of Table I . It is an arrangement of + 1 and -I inputs to the eight units in the module. (In Table I , the I s are suppressed in the inputs for clarity). When we present the first pattern to this module; the resulting activation values simply reflect the effects of the inputs themselves because none of the units are yet influencing any of the others.
Then, we teach the module this pattern by presenting it to the module 10 times. Each time, after the pattern of activation has had plenty of time to settle down , we adjust the weights. The next time we present the complete pattern after the 10 learning trials, the -~.".,.
-'~' -~:"""-module s response is enhanced, compared with the earlier situation. That is, the activation values are increased in magnitude, owing to the combined effects of the external and internal inputs to each of the units. If we present an incomplete part of the pattern, the module can complete it; if we distort the pattern, the module tends to drive the activation back in the direction It thinks it ought to have. Of course, the magnitudes of these effects depend on parameters; but the basic nature of the effects is independent of these details. Figure 3 shows the weights our learning procedure has assigned. Actual numerical Table I .
Thus, we see that more than one pattern can coexist in. the same set of weights. There is an effect of storing multiple patterns, of course. When only one pattern is stored, the whole pattern (or at least, a pale copy of it)
can be retrieved by driving the activation of any single unit in the appropriate direction.
As more patterns are stored, larger subpattems are generally needed to specify the pattern to be retrieved uniquely.
Learning a Prototype From Exemplars
In the preceeding section, we considered the learning of particular patterns and showed that the delta rule was capable of learning multiple patterns, in the same set of connections. In this section, we consider what happens when distributed models using the delta rule are presented with an ensemble of patterns that have some common structure. The examples described in this section illustrate how the delta rule can be used to extract the structure from an ensemble of inputs, and (We are not claiming that the dogs in the world have no more structure than this; we make this assumption for purposes of illustration only. ) For now we will assume that the names of the dogs are all completely different. Given this experience, we would expect that the boy would learn the prototype of the category, even without ever seeing any particular dog which matches the prototype directly (Posner & Keele, 1968 , 1970 Anderson, 1977 , applies an earlier version of a distributed model to this case). That is, the prototype will seem as familiar as any of the exemplars, and he will be able to complete the pattern corresponding to the prototype from any part of it. He will not, however, be very likely to remember the names of each of the individual dogs though he may remember the most recent ones.
We model this situation with a module consisting of 24 units. We assume that the presentation of a dog produces a visual pat- For each presentation, the pattern of activation is allowed to stabilize, and then the weights are adjusted as before. The increment to the weights is then allowed to decay considerably before the next input is presented.
For simplicity, we assume that before the next pattern is presented, the last increment decays to a fixed small proportion of its initial value, and thereafter undergoes no further decay.
What does the module learn? The .module acquires a set of weights which is continually buffeted about by the latest dog exemplar but which captures the prototype dog quite well. Waiting for the last increment to decay to the fixed residual yields the weights shown in Figure 4 .
These weights capture the correlations among the values in the prototype dog pattern quite . well. The lack of exact uniformity is due to the more recent distortions presented, whose effects have not been corrected by subsequent distortions. This is. one way in which the model gives priority to specific exemplars, especially recent ones. The effects of recent exemplars are particularly strong, of course, before they have had a chance to decay. The module can complete the prototype quite well, and it will respond more strongly to the prototype than to any distortion of it. It has, however, learned no particular relation between this prototype and any name pattern, because a totally different random association was presented on each trial. If the pattern of activation on the name units had been the same in every case (say, each dog was just called dog),
or even in just a reasonable fraction of the cases, then the module would have been able to retrieve this shared name pattern from the prototype of the visual pattern and the prototype pattern from the name.
Multiple. nonorthogonal prototypes.
In the preceeding simulation we have seen how the distributed model acts as a sort of signal averager, finding the central tendency of a set of related patterns. This is important, because it means that the model does not fall into the trap of needing to decide which category to put a pattern in before knowing which prototype to average it with. The acquisition of the different prototypes proceeds without any sort of explicit At the end of training, the module was tested by presenting each name pattern and observing the resulting pattern of activation over the visual nodes, and by presenting each visual pattern and observing the pattern of activation over the name nodes. The results are shown in Table 2 . In each case, the model it is sufficient to note that when the sign of all of the elements is correct, as it is in all of the completions in Table 2 , the average magnitude of the activations of the units corresponds to the dot product.
+ -+ -+ -+ -+ -+ + ----+ + + + + ---
In a case like the present one, in which some of the patterns known to the model are correlated, the values of the connection strengths that the model produces do not necessarily have a simple interpretation.
Though their sign always corresponds to the sign ofthe correlation between the activations of the two units, their magnitude is not a simple reflection of the magnitude of their correlation, but is influenced by the degree to which the model is relying on this particular correlation to predict the activation of one node from the others. Thus, in a case where two nodes (call them and j) are perfectly correlated, the strength of the connection from toj will depend on the number of other nodes whose activations are correlated with j. If is the only node correlated with j, it will have to do all the work of predicting j, so the weight will be very strong; on the other hand, if many nodes besides are correlated with j, then the work of predicting j will be spread around, and the weight between and j will be considerably smaller. . The weight matrix acquired as a result of learning the dog, cat, and bagel patterns ( Figure 5 ) reflects these effects. For example, across the set of three prototypes, Units I and 5 are perfectly correlated, as are Units 2 and 6. Yet the connection from 2 to 5 is stronger than the connection from 1 to which correlate perfectly with 4. (In Figure  5 , the weights do not reflect these contrasts perfectly in every case, because the noise introduced into the learning happens by chance to alter some of the correlations present in the prototype patterns. Averaged over time, , though, the weights will conform to their expected values. 
present as a probe a part of the visual pattern if it does not differentiate between the dog and the cat, the model will produce a blended response. Both these aspects of the model seem generally consistent with what we should expect from human subjects.
Category learning without lahe/.\' An important further fact about the model is that it can learn several different visual patterns, even without the benefit of distinct identifying name patterns during learning. To demonstrate this we repeated the previous simulation, simply replacing the name patterns with Os. The model still learns about the internal structure of the visual patterns, so that, after SO cycles through the stimuli, any unique subpart of any one of the patterns is sufficient to reinstate to the rest of the corresponding +3 +5 -2 -1 -3 +2 -+2 JAMES L. MCCLELLAND AND D\VJD E. RUMELHART Table 3 Res"lts of One aspect of our discussion up to this point may have been slightly misleading. We may have given the impression lhat the model is simply a prototype extra((ion device. It is more than this, however, it Is. a device that captures whatever structure, is present in a set of patterns. When the set of patterns has a prototype structure, the model will act as though it is extracting prototypes; but when it has a different structure, the model will do its best to accommodate this as well. For example, the model permits the coexistence of representations of prototypes with representations of particular, repeated exemplars.
Consider the following situation. Let us say that our little boy knows a dog next door named Rover and a dog at his grandma house named Fido. And let' s say that the little boy goes to the park from time to time and sees dogs, each of which his father tells him is a dog.
The simulation-analog of this involved three different eight-element name patterns, one for Rover, one for Fido, and one for Dog.
The visual pattern for Rover was a parti,cuIat randomly generated distortion of th~ dog prototype pattern, as was the visual pattern At the end of 50 learning cycles, the model was able to retrieve the visual pattern corresponding to either repeated exemplar (see Table 4 ) given the associated name as input.
When given the Dog name pattern as input, it retrieves the prototype visual pattern for dog. It can also retrieve the appropriate name from each of the three visual patterns. This is true, even though the visual pattern for Rover differs from the visual pattern for dog by only a single element. Because of the special importance of this particular element, the weights from this element to the units that distinguish Rover s name pattern from the prototype name pattern are quite strong. Given part of a visual pattern, the model will complete it; if the part corresponds to the prototype, then that is what is completed, but if it corresponds to one of the repeated exemplars, that exemplar is completed. The model, then, knows both the prototype and the repeated exemplars quite well. Several other sets of prototypes and their. repeated exemplars could also be stored in the same module, as long as its capacity is not exceeded;
given large numbers of units per module, a lot of different patterns can be stored.
Let us summarize the observations we Visual pattern units is not simply a categorizer or a prototyping device; rather, it captures the structure inherent in a set of patterns, whether it be characteriza,ble by description in terms of prototypes or not. The ability to retrieve accurate completions of similar patterns is a property of the model which depends on the use of the delta learning rule. This allows both the storage of different prototypes that are not completely orthogonal and the coexistence of prototype representations and repeated exemplars.
Simulations of Experimental Results
Up to this point, we have discussed our distributed model in general terms and have outlined how it can accommodate both abstraction and representation of specific information in the same network. We will now consider, in the next two sections, how well the model does in accounting for some recent evidence about the details of the influence of specific experiences on performance.
Repetition and Familiarity Effects
When we perceive an item-say a word. for example-this experience has effects on our later performance. If the word is presented again, within a reasonable interval of time, the prior presentation makes it possible for us to recognize the word more quickly, or from a briefer presentation.
Traditionally, this effect has been inter- and a model of repetition effects for words has been constructed around the logogen concept (Morton, 1979) .
The idea is that the threshold for the logogen is reduced every time it fires (that is, every time the word is recognized), thereby making it easier to fire the logogen at a later time.
There is supposed to be a decay of this priming effect, with time, so that eventually the effect of the first presentation wears off.
This traditional interpretation has come under serious question of late, for a number of reasons. Perhaps paramount among the reasons is the fact that the exact relation between the specific context in which the priming event occurs and the context in which the test event occurs makes a huge difference (Jacoby, 1983a (Jacoby, , 1983b . Generally speaking, nearly any change in the stimulusfrom spoken to printed, from male speaker to female speaker, and so forth-tends to reduce the magnitude of the priming effect.
These facts might easily be taken to support the enumeration of specific experiences view, in which the logogen is replaced by the entire ensemble of experiences with the word, with each experience capturing aspects of the specific context in which it occurred. Such a view has been championed most strongly by Jacoby (1983a Jacoby ( , 1983b ).
Our distributed model offers an alternative interpretation. We see the traces laid down by the processing of each input as contributing to the composite. superimposed memory representation. Each time a stimulus is processed, it gives rise to a slightly different memory trace: either because the item itself is different or because it occurs in a different context that conditions its representation. The logogen is replaced by the set of specific traces, !Jut the traces are not kept separate. Each trice contributes to the composite, but the churactcristics of particular experiences tend nevertheless to be preserved, at least until they are overridden by cancelling characteristics of other traces. And the traces of one stimulus pattern can coexist with the traces of other stimuli, within the same composite memory trace.
It should be noted that we are not faulting either the logogen model or models based on the enumeration of specific experiences for their physiological implausibility here, because these models are generally not stated in physiological terms, and their authors might reasonably argue that nothing in their models precludes distributed storage at a physiological . level. What we are suggesting is that a model which proposes explicitly distributed, superpositional storage can account for the kinds of findings that logogen models have been proposed to account for, as well as other findings which strain the utility of the concept of the logogen as a psychological construct.
In the discussion section we will consider ways in which our distributed model differs from enumeration models as well.
To illustrate the distributed model's account of repetition priming effects, we carried out the following simulation experiment. We made up a set of eight random vectors, each 24 elements long, each one to be thought of as the prototype of a different recurring stimulus pattern. Through a series of 10 training cycles using the set of eight vectors, we constructed a composite memory trace. During training, the model did not actually see the prototypes, however. On each training presentation it saw a new random distortion of one of the eight prototypes. In each of the distortions. each of the 24 elements had its value flipped with a probability of . 1. Weights were adjusted after every presentation, and then allowed to decay to a fixed residual before the presentation of the next pattern.
The composite memory trace formed as a result of the experience just described plays the same role in our model that the set of logogens or detectors play in a model like Morton s or, indeed, the interactive activation model of word preception. That is, the trace contains information which allows the model to enhance perception of familiar patterns, relative to unfamiliar ones. We demonstrate this by comparing the activations resulting from the processing of subsequent presentations of new distortions of our eight familiar patterns with other random patterns with which the model is not familiar. The pattern of activation that is the model's response to the input is stronger, and grows to a particular level more quickly, if the stimulus is a new distortion of an old pattern than if it is a new pattern. We already observed this general enhanced response to exact repetitions of familiar patterns in our first example (see Table I ). To relate these pattern activations to response probabilities, we must assume that mechanisms exist for translating patterns of activation into overt responses measurable by an experimenter. We will assume that these mechanisms obey the principles stated by McClelland and Rumelhart (1981) in the interactive activation model of word perception, simply replacing the activations of particular units with the a measure of pattern activation.
In the interactive activation model, the probability of choosing the response appropriate to a particular unit was based on an exponential transform of a time average of the activation of the unit. This quantity, was divided by the total strength of all alternatives (including itself) to find the response probability (Luce, 1963 Applying the assumptions just described, we can calculate probability of correct response as a function of processing cycles for familiar and unfamiliar patterlJ's. The result, for a particular choice of scaliAg parameters, is shown in Figure 7 . If we assume performance in a perceptual identi':' fication task is based on the height of the curve at the point where processing is cut off by masking , then familiarity would lead to greater accuracy of perceptual identification at a given exposure duration. In a reaction time task, if the respo~se is emitted when its probability reaches a particular threshold activation value (McClelland, 1979) , then familiarity would lead to speeded responses. Thus, the model . is consistent with the ubiquitous influence of familiarity both on response accuracy and We then tested the model's response to (a) the same four distortions; (b) four new distortions of the same patterns; and (c) distortions of the four previously learned patterns that had not been presented as primes. There was no decay in the weights over the course of the priming experiment; if decay had been included, its main effect would have been to reduce the magnitude of the priming effects.
The results of the experiment are shown in Figure 8 . The model also has another advanmge over the logogen view. It accounts for repetition priming effects for unfamiliar as well as familiar stimuli. When a pattern is presented for the first time, a trace is produced just as it would be for stimuli that had previously been presented. The result is that, on a second presentation of the same pattern, or a new distortion of it, processing is facilitated. The functional equivalent of a logogen begins to be established from the very first presentation.
To illustrate the repetition priming of unfamiliar patterns "and to compare the results with the repetition priming we have already observed for familiar patterns, we carried out a third experiment. This time, after learning eight patterns as before, a priming session was run in which new distortions of four of the familiar patterns and distortions of four new patterns were presented. Then, in the test phase, 16 stimuli were presented: New distortions of the primed, familiar patterns; new distortions of the unprimed, familiar patterns; new distortions of the primed, previously unfamiliar patterns; and finally, new distortions of four patterns that were neither primed nor familiar. The results are shown in Figure 9 . What we find is that long-term familiarity and recent priming have approximately additive effects on the asymptotes of the time-accuracy curves. The time to reach any given activation level shows a mild interaction, with priming having slightly more of an effect for unfamiliar than for familiar stimuli.
These results are consistent with the bulk of the findings concerning the effects of preexperimental familiarity and repetition in the recent series of experiments by Feustel Shiffrin, and Salasoo (1983) and Salasoo et al. (1985) . They found that preexperimental familiarity of an item (word vs. nonword) and prior exposure had this very kind of Processing Cycles Figure 10 . The Feustel et al. (1983) and Salasoo et al. (1985) experiments provide very rich and detailed data that go beyond the points we have extracted from them here. We do not claim to have provided a detailed account of all aspects of their data. However, we simply wish to note that the general form of their basic findings is consistent with a model the distributed type. In particular , we see no reason to assume that the process by which unfamiliar patterns become familiar involves the formation of an abstract, logogenlike unit separate from the episodic traces responsible for repetition priming effects.
There is one finding by Salasoo et al. (1985) that appears to support the view that there is some special process of unit formation that is distinct from the priming of old units. ..c: 
Representation of General and Specific Information
In the previous section, we cast our distributed model as an alternative to the view that familiar patterns are represented in memory either by separate detectors or by an enumeration of specific experiences. In this section
we show that the model provides alternatives to both abstraction and enumeration models of learning from exemplars of prototypes.
Abstraction models were originally motivated by the finding that subjects occasionally.
appeared to have learned better how to categorize the prototype of a set of distorted exemplars than the specific exemplars they experienced during learning (Posner & Keele, 1968) . However, pure abstraction models have never fared very well, because there is nearly always evidence of some superiority of the particular training stimuli over other stimuli equally far removed from the prototype. A favored model , then, is one in which there is both abstraction and memory for particular training stimuli. Recently, proponents of models involving only enumeration of specific experiences have noted that such models can account for the basic fact that abstraction models are primarily designed to account for-enhanced response to the prototype, relative to particular previously seen exemplars, under some conditions-as well as failures to obtain such eflccts under other conditions (Hintzman, 1983; Medin & Shaffer, 1978) . In evaluating distributed models, it is important to see if they can do as well. Anderson (1977) The actual stimuli used can be filled in by replacing P with +-+-; A with ++--; B with +--+; and C with ++++. The model is not sensitive to the fact the same subpattern was used in each of the five slots.
made important steps in this direction, and Knapp and Anderson (1984) have shown how their distributed model can account for many of the details of the Posner-Keele experiments. Recently, however, two sets of findings -have been put forward which appear to strongly favor the enumeration of specific experiences view, at least relative to pure abstraction models. It is important, therefore to see how we!l our distributed model can in accounting for these kinds of effects.
The first set of findings cQmes from a set of studies by Whittlesea (1983) . In a large number of studies, Whittlesea demonstrated a role for specific exemplars in guiding performance on a perceptual identification task.
We wanted to see whether our model would demonstrate a similar sensitivity to specie, exemplars. We also wanted to see whetheõ ur model would account for the conditionS' under which such effects are not obtained. Whittlesea used letter strings as stimuli. The learning experiences subjects received involved simply looking at the stimuli one at a time on a visual display and writing down the sequence of letters presented. Subjects were subsequently tested for the effect of this training on their ability to identify letter strings bearing various relations to the training stimuli and to the prototypes from which the training stimuli were derived. The test was a perceptual identification task; the subject was simply required to try to identify the letters from a brief flash.
The stimuli Whittlesea used were all distortions ofdne of two prototype letter strings. Table   illustrates the essential properties of the sets of training and test stimuli he used. The stimuli in Set Ia were each one step away from the prototype. The Ib items were also one step from the prototype and one step from one of the Ia distortions. The Set lIa stimuli were each two steps from the prototype, and one step from a particular Ia distortion. The Set lIb items were also two steps from the prototype, and each was one step from one of the lIa distortions. The Set IIc distortions were two steps from the prototype also, and each was two steps from the closest lIa distortion. Over the set of five IIc distortions, the A and B subpatterns each occurred once in each position, as they did in the case of the lIa distortions. The distortions in Set III were three steps from the prototype, and one step from the closest member of Set IIa. The distortions in Set V were each five steps from the prototype. Whittlesea ran seven experiments using different combinations of training and test stimuli. We carried out simulation analogs of all of these experiments, plus one additional experiment that Whittlesea did not run. The main difference between the simulation experiments and Whittlesea s actual experiments was that he used two different prototypes in each experiment, whereas we only used one.
The simulation used a simple 20-unit module. The set of 20 unit$ was divided into five submodules, one for each letter in Whittlesea s letter strings. The prototype pattern and the different distortions used can be derived from the information provided in Table   Each simulation Experiments 4, 4' , and 5 examine the status of the prototype and other test stimuli closer to the prototype than any stimuli actually shown during training. In Experiment 4, the training stimuli were fairly far away from the prototype, and there were only five different training stimuli (the members of the lIa set). In this case, controlling for distance from the nearest training stimuli, test stimuli closer to the prototype showed more enhancement than those farther away (Ia vs. III comparison). However, the actual training stimuli nevertheless had an advantage over both other sets of test stimuli, including those that were closer to the prototype than the training stimuli themselves (lla vs. la comparison).
In Experiment 4' (not run by Whittlesea) the same number of training stimuli were used as in Experiment 4 , but these were presentations. To avoid idiosyncratic effects of particular orders of training stimuli, each experiment was run six times, each with a different random order of training stimuli.
On each trial, activations were allowed to settle down through 50 processing cycles, and then connection strengths were adjusted.
There was no decay of the increments to the weights over the course of an experiment.
In the test phase, the model was tested with the sets of test items analogous to the relative to a pretest baseline. For Whittlesea data, this is the per letter increase in letter identification probability between a pre-and posttest. For the simulation, it is the increase in the size of the dot product for a pretest with null weights and a J)C?sttest after training.
For comparability to the data, the dot product difference scores have been doubled. This is simply a scaling operation to facilitate qualitative comparison of experimental and simulation results. comparison of the experimental,tand simulation results shows that wherever tbere is a within-experiment difference in Whittles data., the simulation produced a difference in the same direction. (Between experiment comparisons are not considered because of subject and material differences which renders such differences unreliable. ) The next several paragraphs review some of the major findings in detail.
Some of the comparisons bring out the importance of congruity between particular test and training experiences. Experiments I, 2, and 3 show that when distance of test stimuli from the prototype is controlled, similarity to particular training exemplars makes a difference both for the human subject and in the model. In Experiment I, the relevant contrast was between la and Ib items. In Experiment 2, it was between lIa and IIc items. Experiment 3 shows that the subjects ...
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closer to the prototype. The result is that the simulation shows an advantage for the prototype over the old exemplars. The specific training stimuli used even in this experiment do influence performance, however, as Whittlesea s first experiment (which used the same training set) shows (Ia-Ib contrast). This effect holds both for the subjects and for the simulation. The pattern of results is similar to the findings of Posner and Keele (1968) , in the condition where subjects learned six exemplars which were rather close to the prototype. In this condition, their subjects' categorization performance was most accurate for the prototype, but more accurate for old than for r.ew distortions, just as in this simulation experiment.
In Experiment Experiments 6 and 7 examine in different ways the relative influence of similarity to the prototype and similarity to the set of training exemplars, using small numbers of training exemplars rather far from the prototype. Both in the data and in the model, similarity to particular training stimuli is more important than similarity to the prototype, given the sets of training stimuli used in these experiments. Taken together with other findings, Whittlesea s results show clearly that similarity of test items to particular stored exemplars is of paramount importance in predicting perceptual performance. Other experiments show the relevance of these same factors in other tasks, such as recognition memory, classification learning, and so forth. It is interesting to note that performance does not honor the specific exemplars so strongly when the training items are closer to the prototype. Under such conditions, performance is superior on the prototype or stimuli closer to the prototype than the training stimuli. Even when the training stimuli are rather distant from the prototype, they produce a benefit for stimuli closer to the prototype, if there are a large number of distinct training stimuli each shown only once. Thus, the dominance of specific training experiences is honored only when the training experiences are few and far between. Otherwise, an apparent advantage for the prototype, though with some residual benefit for particular training stimuli is the result.
The congruity of the results of these simulations with experimental findings underscores the applicability of distributed models to the question of the nature of the representation of general and specific information. In fact, we were somewhat surprised by the ability of the model to account for Whittlesea s results, given the fact that we did not rely on context-sensitive encoding of the letter string stimuli. That is, the distributed representation we assigned to each letter was independent of the other letters in the string.
However, a context sensitive encoding would prove necessary to capture a larger ensemble of stimuli.
Whether a context-sensitive encoding would produce the same or slightly different results depends on the exact encoding. The exact degree of overlap of the patterns of activation produced by different distortions of the same prototype determines the extent to which the model will tend to favor the prototype relative When all the distortions are close to the prototype, or when there is a very large number of different distortions, the central tendency will produce the strongest response; but when the distortions are fewer, and farther from the prototype, the training exemplars themselves will produce the strongest activations. What the encoding would effect is the similarity metric.
In this regard, it is worth mentioning an-
other finding that appears to challenge our distributed account of what is learned through DISTRIBUTED MEMORY 183 repeated experiences with exemplars. This is the finding of Medin and Schwanenflugel ( 1981) . Their experiment compared ease of learning of two different sets of stimuli in a categorization task. One set of stimuli could be categorized by a linear combination of weights assigned to particular values on each of four dimensions considered independently.
The other set of stimuli coula not be categorized in this way; and yet, the experiment clearly demonstrated that linear separability was not necessary for categorization learning. In one experiment, linearly separable stimuli were less easily learned than a set of stimuli that were not linearly separable but had a higher degree of intraexempIar similiarity within categories.
At first glance, it may seem that Medin Clelland, and Rumelhart (in press), and Rumelhart and McClelland (in press ).
It should be noted that the motivation for context-sensitive encoding in the use of distributed representations is captured by but by no means limited to the kinds of observations reported in the experiment by Medin and Schwanenflugel. The trouble is that the assignment of particular context-sensitive encodings to stimuli is at present rather ad hoc: There are too many different possible ways it can be done to know which way is right.
What is needed is a principled way of assigning distributed representations to patterns of activation. The problem is a severe one, but really it is no different from the problem that all models face, concerning the assignment of representations to stimuli. What we can say for sure at this point is that contextsensitive encoding is necessary, for distributed models or for any other kind.
Discussion
Until very recently, the exploration of distributed models was restricted to a few workers, mostly coming. from fields other than cognitive psychology. Although in some cases, particularly in the work of Anderson (1977; Anderson et aI., 1977; Knapp & Anderson 1984) , some implications of these models for our understanding of memory and learning have been pointed out, they have only begun to be applied by researchers primarily concerned with understanding cognitive processes per se. The present article, along with those of Murdock (1982) and Eich (1982) , represents what we hope will be the beginning of a more serious examination of these kinds of models by cognitive psychologists. For they provide, we believe, important alternatives to traditional conceptions of representation and memory.
We have tried to illustrate this point here by showing how the distributed approach circumvents the dilemma of specific trace models. Distributed memories abstract even while they preserve the details of recent, or frequently repeated, experiences. Abstraction and preservation of information about specific stimuli are simply different reflections of the operation of the same basic learning mechanism.
The basic points we have been making can of course be generalized in several different directions. Here we will mention two: The relation between episodic and semantic memory (Tulving, 1972) assumptions about the learning experiences to which a child is exposed, the mode""rovides a fairly accurate account of the , ..me course of acquisition of the past tense (Brawn, 1973; Ervin, 1964; Kuczaj, 1977) .
In general distributed models appear to provide alternatives to a variety of different kinds of models that postulate abstract, summary representations such as prototypes, 10-gogens, semantic memory representations, or even linguistic rules.
Why Prefer a Distributed Model?
The fact that distributed models provide alternatives to other sorts of accounts is important, but the fact that they are sometimes Even here, there are differences, however.
Though both models superimpose traces of different experiences, distributed models do so at the time of storage, while enumeration models do so at the time of retrieval. But there is no evidence to support the separate storage assumption of enumeration models.
Indeed, most such models assume that performance is always based on a superimposition of the specific experiences. Now , our distributed model could be rejected if convincing evidence of separate storage could be provided, for example, by some kind of experiment in which a way was found to separate the effects of different memory experiences. But the trend in a number of recent.
approaches to memory has bt:en to emphasize the ubiquity of interactions between memory traces. Distributed models are essentially constructed around the assumption that memory traces interact by virtue of the nature of the manner in which they are stored, and they provide an explan~tion for these inter- Of course this does not mean that our distributed model will not turn out to be exact notational varibnt of some particular other model. What it does mean is that our distributed model must be treated as an alternative to-rather than simply an implementation of -existing models of learning and memory.
Interdependence of theoretical assumptions. There is another reason for taking distributed models seriously as psychological models. Even in cases where our distributed model may not be testably distinct from existing models, it does provide an entire constellation of assumptions which go together as a package. In this regard, it is interesting to contrast a distributed model with a model such as to US, much of the appeal of distributed models is that they do not already have to be intelligent in order to learn, like some models do. Doubtless, sophisticated hypothesis testing models of learning such as those which have grown out of the early concept identification work of Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956) or out of the artificial intelligence learning tradition established by Winston (1975) have their place , but for many phenomena, particularly those that do not seem to require explicit hypothesis formation and testing, the kind of learning mechanism incorporated in our distributed model may be more appropriate.
Two final reasons for preferring a distributed representation are that it leads us to understand some of the reasons why human behavior tends to exhibit such strong regularities. Some of the regularity is due to the structure of the world, of course, but much of it is a result of the way in which our cultures structure it; certainly the regularity of languages is a fact about the way humans communicate that psychological theory can be asked to explain. Distributed models provide some insight both into why it is beneficial for behavior to be regular, and how it comes to be that way.
It is beneficial for behavior to be regular, because regularity allows us to economize on the size of the networks that must be devoted to processing in a particular environment. If all experiences were completely random and unrelated to ,each other, a distributed rKodel would buy us very little-in fact it w~uld cost us a bit-relative to separate enumeration of experiences. An illuminating analysis of this situation is given by Willshaw (1981) .
Where a distributed model pays off, though is in the fact that it can capture generalizations economically, given that there are generalizations. Enumeration models lack this feature. There are of course limits on how much can be stored in a distributed memory system, but the fact that it can abstract extends those limits far beyond the capacity of any system relying on the separate enumeration of experiences, whenever abstraction is warranted by the ensemble of inputs.
We have just explained how distributed models can help us understand why it is a good thing for behavior to exhibit regularity, but we have not yet indicated how they help us understand how it comes to be regular.
But it is easy to see how distributed models tend to impose regularity. When a new pattern is presented, the model will impose regularity by dealing with it as it has learned to deal with similar patterns in the past; the model automatically generalizes. In our analysis of past tense learning (Rumelhart & McClelland, in press) , it is just this property of distributed models which leads them to produce the kinds of over-regularizations we see in language development; the same property, operating in all of the members of a culture at the same time, will tend to produce regularizations in the entire language.
Conclusion
The distributed approach is in its infancy, and we do not wish to convey the impression that we have solved all the problems of learning and memory simply by invoking it.
Considerable effort is needed on several fronts. We will mention four that seem of paramount importance: (a) Distributed models must be (Ackley, Hinton, & Sejnowski, 1985; McClelland, 1985; Rumelhart & Zipser 1985) .
Although much remains to be done, we hope we have demonstrated that distributed models provide distinct, conceptuallyattrac- 
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tivealtematives to models involving the explicit formation of abstractions or the enumeration of specific experiences. Just how far distributed models can take us toward an understanding of learning and memory remains to be seen.
